Towards a New Economics of Collapse and Construction

Introduction: Economics in an Age of Transformation

The global economic and political order is undergoing rapid and profound transformation. We are witnessing a far-reaching 'organic' crisis of the global economic world order, which may have started with the financial crisis of 2007/2008 but now enters a new, much more dynamic phase. The crisis of the hitherto Western-dominated global economic and geopolitical order—with its network of international institutions, military supremacy, and the US dollar as the preeminent reserve currency—is gaining momentum. Indeed, we are witnessing not only the most profound transformation of the global order since the Second World War, but, on a more fundamental level, the end of 500 years of Western hegemony. One may also add the approaching end of the 300-year fossil fuel age and 11,000 years of stable climatic conditions for human development in the Holocene.

Amid these upheavals and uncertainties, incisive political economy and economic analysis are essential—analysis that both illuminates complex global dynamics and provides a sound framework for navigating them thoughtfully. At this critical juncture, there is an unprecedented need for an economic science that fully incorporates political and economic dimensions within a global, historically informed perspective—one that relies on genuine interdisciplinary methods. Mainstream economics, with its abstract and unrealistic model assumptions, linear equilibrium calculations, and narrow, individual-centric microeconomic focus that overlooks political, social, and historical contexts, is of little help. Whereas during both the Keynesian era and the period of neoliberal globalization, mainstream economics might have at least claimed to provide a scientific basis for prevailing policy doctrines, today it fails to offer meaningful insights into the disintegration of our economic order or practical guidance for managing transformative economic change.

I analyzed the crisis of mainstream economics and its core assumptions in the related essay “The Strange Non-Death of Mainstream Economics.” In my essay “The Project of Pluralism”, I examined why heterodox or pluralist economics—as paradigmatic alternatives—have struggled to supplant mainstream economics despite its evident limitations. I argued that any serious challenger must link discursive-institutional change in science to a broader process of societal change. Without multiple forms of coordination and correspondence between science on the one hand and civil society (e.g., NGOs, think tanks, political parties, media organizations, social movements) on the other, the institutional-political network of mainstream economics cannot be effectively dissolved and replaced. I put forward the thesis that pluralist economics, while a desirable and advanced proposal in theory, lacks the political and strategic mechanisms to build such far-reaching alliances between science and civil society. The project of pluralism, though successful on its own terms, is thus insufficient to radically transform economics and the social sciences. As I concluded, it should be complemented by further approaches.

Building on this conclusion, I aim to outline how a more strategic focus on specific, existing theories—particularly those addressing systemic collapse and reconstruction—can coalesce into a newly accentuated understanding within economics. This approach, which we might provisionally call a 'New Economics of Collapse and Construction,' is not about inventing a wholly new paradigm from scratch, but rather forging a more potent synthesis. Though nascent, this synthesis holds promise for developing over the coming decades into a coherent alternative to mainstream economics, moving beyond calls for mere pluralism.

I will start by offering a political-economy interpretation of current economic and political changes. I will then introduce the new debate on economic planning, which I see as a crucial element in a 'New Economics of Collapse and Construction'. Finally, I will return to strategic questions of curriculum change in the context of global economic transformation.

The Fourth Great Crisis of Capitalism in the Context of Ecological Breakdown

A historical perspective is essential for understanding our current economic situation and defining the starting point for a strategic synthesis of existing theories—moving beyond fragmented pluralism toward more coherent alternatives. 

Capitalism's historical trajectory has been defined by four major structural crises, each marking a fundamental shift in its developmental logic (see Decker and Sablowski 2017). The capitalist mode of production first consolidated in Britain in the late 18th century, spreading to France, Germany, and the USA by the mid-19th century. British hegemony rested on superior textile productivity and naval power, enabling it to set global rules for trade, finance, and production under a liberal-capitalist order. Key features included the gold standard, sterling as the global currency, competition-regulated prices and wages, and exploitation based primarily on absolute surplus value (lengthening work hours). Formal subsumption of labour under capital prevailed, with skilled workers retaining significant practical knowledge. Labour movements were weak, social reproduction relied partly on subsistence, and the state's role was limited. Accumulation focused on Department I (means of production), constituting a regime of predominantly extensive accumulation.

This extensive accumulation entered its first major crisis around 1873. Unlike cyclical downturns, stagnation persisted despite wage/price adjustments and capital destruction. The crisis stemmed from exhausted dynamics: extending work hours hit limits, while methods for relative surplus value (raising productivity to lower labour's value) remained underdeveloped. Protectionism challenged liberal order. Lasting two decades, the crisis was overcome through profound regulatory shifts: monopolistic structures (trusts, cartels) altered pricing, labour movements stabilized workers' purchasing power and limited work hours, and new industries emerged. Accumulation remained in Department I, but international competition intensified over raw materials and markets, ushering in imperialism. Rivalry between rising powers (Germany, USA) and Britain led to conflictual cooperation (e.g., colonial partitions) and ultimately World War I. The war triggered revolutionary challenges, most suppressed except in Russia (1917). Post-war, Britain lacked capacity, and the USA lacked political will, to restore liberal order. States clung to outdated policies, lacking tools to manage inflation/deflation swings. The Great Depression (1929) saw protectionism fragment the world market, collapsing global trade.

This second crisis revealed a deeper mismatch: new production structures (Taylorism, mechanization) enabled massive productivity gains but required a new accumulation regime based on mass consumption of capitalist goods. This only emerged after labour movements, though defanged revolutionarily, gained strength to force reforms: industrial unions, collective bargaining linking wages to productivity, and the welfare state securing purchasing power during unemployment/illness. These conditions materialized in the USA in the 1930s and post-WWII in Western Europe/Japan, enabling Fordism. This regime combined standardized mass production (Department I) with mass consumption (Department II), creating a predominantly intensive accumulation regime maximizing relative surplus value. US leadership in Fordism underpinned its post-WWII hegemony, cemented by victory and the Cold War. The Bretton Woods system (1944) – gold-backed dollar, fixed exchange rates – provided monetary stability, though it increasingly facilitated credit expansion aligned with production growth. Credit was tightly regulated (capital controls, state-directed banks, regulated interest), complemented by Keynesian demand management.

Fordism entered its third major crisis in the late 1960s. Productivity gains from Taylorism dwindled. Workers rebelled against work intensification (strikes, absenteeism). Rising organic composition of capital (increased mechanization) couldn't be offset by higher exploitation rates, causing profit rates to fall. Markets for durable goods saturated, and overcapacity emerged from catch-up development in Europe/Japan. US hegemony faltered: US firms invested heavily in Europe, while European/Japanese exports flooded the US, causing US trade deficits and massive offshore dollar holdings exceeding US gold reserves. The Vietnam War exacerbated problems. In 1971, the US ended dollar-gold convertibility; fixed exchange rates collapsed in 1973. The resulting stagflation (stagnation + inflation) defied Keynesian solutions. Labour's initial offensive (late 60s/early 70s) secured wage gains and welfare expansion, but mass unemployment from the mid-70s recession weakened it.

Neoliberalism, emerging in the 1940s but previously marginalized, gained ascendancy (Thatcher, Reagan). It weakened unions, promoted supply-side policies, and deregulated finance, initiating neoliberal globalization. The core of this new regime was transnational production networks. Initially, labour-intensive production shifted to low-wage countries (e.g., apparel leaving Germany). Complex production (e.g., autos) fragmented, outsourcing labour-intensive processes. Double fragmentation (spatial and organizational via subcontracting) slashed wage costs and raised exploitation. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc and China's integration added hundreds of millions of workers/consumers, enabling entire production complexes to relocate. This created a third international division of labour: producing similar goods in vastly different ways, putting locations into direct, comprehensive competition. This intensified pressure on wages/conditions, exacerbated by mass unemployment in the core and faster labour release than absorption in the periphery.

Value distribution shifted: wage shares fell in core countries (since mid-1970s) and inequality rose in China. Real wages lagged behind productivity. While solving 1970s profitability, this exacerbated overproduction tendencies. Mass consumption was sustained only by soaring household debt (PCs, internet, cars, education, healthcare). Financialization also reshaped corporate strategies (pressure for short-term shareholder value, stock buybacks, reduced investment, higher leverage) and states (tax cuts for capital financed by regressive shifts, spending cuts, and higher debt). Growing trade imbalances reflected unequal success in location competition, fueling international debt. Financial expansion (deregulation, liberalization, globalization) enabled this debt-driven demand, defining a finance-dominated accumulation regime. Despite 1970s/80s "decline of the US" debates, the US maintained hegemony as the 'global state,' underpinned by military power and the dollar's role as world money (trade, reserves), allowing massive foreign borrowing despite economic decline. 

The fourth major crisis erupted in 2007-08. Preceded by the milder 2000-02 dot-com bust, the crisis originated in the US subprime mortgage bubble. When it burst, falling house prices triggered foreclosures, impacting globally via securitized debt (mortgage-backed securities). Interbank lending froze due to distrust, then credit to firms stalled, causing a deep global recession. Unprecedented state intervention (bank bailouts, stimulus) followed, coordinated by the G20 summits. Bailouts transformed private into public debt; deficits soared due to unemployment, lower tax revenue, and stimulus. Post-recession, austerity prevailed, and deficit countries imposed wage cuts. This crisis exposed the limits of the finance-dominated regime: redistribution from labour to capital (falling wage shares) intensified overproduction. Financialization (credit expansion, fictitious capital growth) had masked this, but the gap between real valorization possibilities and inflated asset values became unsustainable, leading to recurring bubbles and crashes (2000, 2007). Globalization's limits also emerged: China's massive overcapacity, unresolved global imbalances (e.g., Germany/China surpluses vs. US deficits), and the unsustainability of the US 'consumer of last resort' role. Geopolitically, the crisis manifested as failed multilateralism (e.g., WTO Doha Round) and the rise of BRICS states challenging Western dominance. The crisis became multi-dimensional – economic, political, social, and ecological – marking a fundamental crisis of global capitalism.

The current political and economic shifts are distinctively significant because they may signal a qualitative intensification and acceleration within the fourth great crisis. Even if we have thus far only been at the onset of capitalism’s fourth great crisis, we might now be entering a second phase marked by heightened crisis dynamics. This accelerated transformation phase is characterized by intensified geopolitical conflicts and new bloc formation, exacerbating both the economic crisis and the crisis of democracy.

The interplay of continuity and rupture in global capitalism's transformation during its organic crisis remains hard to predict. What is certain is that the potential for further geopolitical and economic turmoil is only beginning to unfold. A new cold war between China and the United States is emerging. Moreover, economic crisis dynamics may accelerate further—as the dollar's crisis as the world’s reserve currency deepens, opening the door to new debt crises that could further erode the foundations of capitalist centers. Generally speaking, this second phase will be characterized by the mutual reinforcement of its (geo)political, economic, social, and ecological dimensions and a general acceleration of the crisis. It is marked by the irreversible exceeding of planetary tipping points, the materialization of climate catastrophe through extreme weather events, crop failures, and other disasters, increased geopolitical (military) conflicts and bloc formation, and increasing migration movements—all interconnected with the economic crisis of globalization and the political crisis of liberal democracy (Alami, Copley, & Moraitis 2023; Albert 2020). Predicting how long this accelerated transformation phase will last, or whether a third phase of stabilization is even realistic in the coming decades, is difficult.

This uncertainty is especially due to the ecological context of the fourth great crisis, which was absent in previous periods of capitalist transformation. Previous systemic transformations did not unfold against such dire planetary limits. Over the last half-century, humanity has transgressed multiple Earth system boundaries—primarily climate change, biodiversity loss, land-system change, and nitrogen and phosphorus cycles—bringing us closer to irreversible tipping points (Rockström et al. 2009). Unlike the resource scarcities shaping earlier crises, we now confront feedback loops—melting permafrost releasing methane, ocean stratification reducing carbon uptake, and rainforest dieback—that threaten to accelerate warming independently of further emissions (IPCC 2023).

Moreover, the scale and speed of ecological breakdown are entwined with the mechanisms of neoliberal globalization. Transnational production networks externalize environmental costs onto the Global South, where deforestation, soil degradation, and water scarcity advance unchecked to meet global commodity demands (Martinez-Alier 2014). Meanwhile, financial markets increasingly treat nature as a tradable asset—through carbon credits, biodiversity offsets, and 'green' derivatives—further financializing ecological systems and distancing capital from the real biophysical processes on which it depends. This financialization exacerbates ecological instability by subordinating conservation to profit maximization and obscuring the true costs of ecosystem collapse.

The interaction between ecological collapse and economic crisis deepens capitalism's structural contradictions. As climate-driven disasters—extreme heat, floods, droughts—disrupt agriculture and infrastructure, supply chains buckle, inflationary pressures mount, and social unrest intensifies (Klein 2014). The imperative to maintain growth collides directly with the need for rapid decarbonization and ecological regeneration, producing policy paralysis or half-measures that satisfy neither investors nor communities on the frontlines of climate breakdown. At this juncture, the boundaries between economic, political, and ecological crises blur: mitigating climate collapse demands not only new technologies or market tweaks, but a fundamental reorganization of production, distribution, and social reproduction along ecologically sustainable and socially just lines (Raworth 2017).

In a 'New economics of collapse and construction,' the collapse pillar would integrate disciplines, theories, and research programs that critically examine the interlocking crises of ecological unraveling and the disintegration of the existing global political-economic order. This pillar focuses on diagnosing systemic failures—from biodiversity loss and climate tipping points to geopolitical fragmentation and inequality-driven instability—while interrogating how these crises mutually reinforce one another. It positions collapse not as an endpoint, but as a contested process demanding radical reimagining of governance, production, and distribution. This is where the second, construction pillar comes in—constituted by the new debate on economic planning.

The New Debate on Economic Planning

The new debate on economic planning reflects a growing recognition that neither market signals alone nor classical forms of state intervention can address the scale and complexity of our intertwined crises.

Interestingly, this contemporary debate emerges simultaneously from distinct perspectives:

1. A reform-oriented, partly technocratic perspective argues that classical political tools for steering the economy must be adapted and expanded to stabilize the economy and enable a green transition (see e.g., Braun 2018; Ban & Hasselbalch 2024; Gabor & Braun 2025; Herrmann 2022; Krahe 2022).

2. A more radical perspective conceptualizes planned economies beyond markets, including references to historical planned economies (see e.g., Phillips and Rozworski 2019; Morozov 2019; Jones 2020; Malm 2021; Hahnel 2021; Benanav 2022; Laibman 2022; Laibman & Campbell 2022; Vettese & Pendergrass 2022; Dapprich 2022; Beckmann et al. 2024; Laurin-Lamothe et al. 2025; Sorg & Groos 2025a; Groos & Sorg 2025b). These authors frame planning not as a return to centralized command economies, but as a multilayered, democratic project coordinating investment, production, and distribution in line with social and ecological goals.

3. This strand increasingly intertwines with developments in the degrowth discourse. Well-known post-growth advocates speak of a “planned reduction in energy and material consumption” (Hickel 2021: 1) and a “planned contraction of economic activity for the purpose of increasing prosperity and equality” (Schmelzer 2015: 264; cited in Durand, Hofferberth & Schmelzer 2024: 1f).

The contemporary planning debate revives and reimagines the 20th-century socialist calculation debate. By the mid-20th century, mainstream economists like Joseph Schumpeter, Paul Samuelson, and Wassily Leontief concluded rational economic planning was possible, empirically validated by the Soviet Union’s industrialization. However, the crises of the 1970s—stagflation, debt collapses, Soviet stagnation—shattered this optimism. Market mechanisms resurged as the presumed antidote to centralized planning’s rigidity. Today, amid capitalism’s failures to address the climate crisis and inequality, planning is experiencing a renaissance. Central to past academic debates, there is ample reason to expect economic planning can regain this role within academic economics.

Before addressing strategic questions of curriculum change, I will describe how the new planning paradigm constitutes a fundamental alternative to mainstream economics.

The Planning Paradigm as a Fundamental Alternative to Mainstream Economics

The planning paradigm represents a fundamental departure from mainstream economics, which remains anchored in the assumption that market mechanisms—even when imperfect—are the primary or sole means of efficiently allocating resources. Rooted in neoclassical frameworks, mainstream economics conceptualizes economies as self-correcting systems where prices signal scarcity, coordinate decentralized decisions, and optimize outcomes through equilibrium dynamics.

At its core, the planning paradigm rejects the naturalization of market dynamics that characterizes mainstream economics. Rather than treating economies as self-equilibrating systems guided by price signals, it recognizes all economic systems as politically constructed terrains of coordination. This ontological shift exposes two critical realities obscured by neoclassical frameworks:

1. Ubiquity of Planning: Economic planning is not an exotic alternative but an inherent feature of complex societies. Capitalist firms engage in meticulous internal planning (supply chains, R&D, workforce organization), while states continuously plan through monetary policy, industrial strategies, and regulatory frameworks. Markets themselves are shaped by prior planning decisions—property rights regimes, financial architectures, and legal infrastructures that define the "rules of the game." The crucial distinction lies not in the presence of planning, but in its locus of control (corporate boardrooms vs. democratic institutions), its driving logic (profit maximization vs. social-ecological needs), and its degree of coherence (fragmented private planning vs. integrated social planning).

2. The Coordination Imperative: Advanced economies exhibit profound interdependence—thousands of specialized producers rely on precise inputs from others to deliver final goods. Under capitalism, this interdependence is mediated through competitive markets, generating emergent "system effects" (business cycles, financial crises, supply chain disruptions) that appear as external forces beyond human control. The planning paradigm confronts this alienation directly. It asks how societies can consciously coordinate interdependent production ex ante through democratic institutions rather than experiencing coordination ex post through crisis-driven market adjustments. This reframes the core economic question from efficient allocation under scarcity to democratic reconciliation of social needs with ecological boundaries.

The planning paradigm recognizes economies as politically constructed and contested terrains where planning—conscious, collective, power-laden efforts to structure property relations, employ human labour, and to coordinate production, distribution, and investment—is the fundamental activity. Markets are seen not as spontaneous natural orders, but as institutionalized social constructs, shaped by prior planning decisions (legal frameworks, property rights, monetary systems) and embedded within power relations. The crucial questions become: Who controls the planning processes? (Democratic publics, private capital, state technocrats?) What logics drive planning? (Profit maximization, human need, ecological sustainability?) How do the emergent dynamics generated by planning interact with and constrain human agency? By centering these questions, the planning paradigm transcends the ideological naturalization of capitalism inherent in mainstream economics and opens the analytical space for envisioning and constructing fundamentally different, democratically steered, socio-ecological futures. Its core insight is not that planning eliminates systemic complexity or unintended consequences, but that all socio-economic orders are planned systems. 

Planning occurs at multiple, interconnected levels: within firms (corporate strategy, supply chain management), by states (fiscal and monetary policy, industrial strategy, regulation), by financial institutions (credit allocation, investment decisions), and within households. Markets themselves are not spontaneous givens but are instituted and shaped by prior and ongoing planning decisions (e.g., defining property rights, establishing currencies, setting labor standards, structuring competition). The paradigm thus asks not if planning exists, but how it is organized, what logics drive it (profit, power, need, sustainability), and who controls its processes.

Building on a ciritical political economy approach one could characterise planning under capitalism as follows: Companies plan to extract surplus value or profit (private planning), while states plan to secure overall accumulation (public planning). Public economic planning is highly contradictory and complex, as economic developments under capitalism are the sum of countless isolated investment decisions within a system of isolated private production yet simultaneous interdependence. In this systemic uncertainty, emergent system dynamics ('market forces') arise, to which companies and states react through public and private planning (ibid., Heyer 2025, Sorg 2023: 3f., Devine 2002).

It must be stressed that emphasizing the role of planning in capitalism or 'the economy' should not be misconstrued as denying emergent and uncontrollable dimensions of economic systems. Unlike mainstream economics—which mystifies markets as spontaneous orders governed by a 'higher reason' (e.g., the invisible hand)—the planning paradigm is grounded in a historical-materialist dialectic. Here, socially embedded planning inevitably generates alienated or reified structures: the totality of individual and institutional plans coalesces into autonomous, unintended systemic forces (market imperatives, accumulation crises). These forces develop an objectified logic—dynamic, contradictory, and often operating beyond conscious control—which imposes itself back upon society as an external constraint. Precisely by centering economic planning as the fundamental unit of analysis, we expose its dual role: it is the generative source of socioeconomic processes, yet simultaneously subjugated to the emergent dynamics it unleashes.

The planning paradigm thus adopts a structural-relational ontology. It starts from the recognition that individuals are always already embedded within, and constituted by, historically specific social relations of production, power hierarchies, and institutional frameworks. Economic outcomes are not the sum of individual choices, but the result of the dynamic interplay between collective actors (classes, states, corporations), institutional designs, and the systemic imperatives (like capital accumulation) generated by these structures. Planning is inherently a collective, institutional process situated within this relational field.

Mainstream economics follows the “utopia of the market” (Vogl 2012), elevating markets to a quasi-metaphysical entity promising efficiency, stability, and prosperity if left undisturbed. The planning paradigm, conversely, proceeds from the assumption that markets are deeply embedded in power relations, shaped by government policies, financial institutions, and profit interests, and that economic planning—not market exchange—is the key principle underpinning every economic system.

The Planning Paradigm and Pluralist Economics

After comparing mainstream economics and the planning paradigm, a distinct challenge emerges when juxtaposing the latter with pluralist economics. These two paradigms operate on fundamentally different levels. Pluralism is a meta-theoretical and methodological framework prescribing normative ideals about scientific inquiry and institutional organization. The planning paradigm, in contrast, is rooted in epistemological and ontological commitments, adopts a problem-driven focus, and arises from traditions of political economy and institutionalist thought.

Yet, as argued, the planning paradigm incorporates internal pluralism, drawing on institutionalist, political-economy, ecological, and other perspectives. Unlike pluralism’s abstract methodological advocacy, the planning paradigm demarcates a concrete problem—the organization of economies through planning—and invites diverse theoretical frameworks to engage with it. In doing so, it embodies a meta-paradigmatic logic, structuring intellectual debate around a shared problem-space while accommodating methodological and ideological diversity.

My central contention, however, is that the paradox of pluralism—stemming from its inability to articulate a unified transformative vision without abandoning its commitment to diversity—poses such a profound dilemma that it leaves little room for compromise. To achieve meaningful curricular reform, we must confront this irreconcilable contradiction: the moment pluralism coalesces into a "clear-cut" science-based project with strategic coherence, it ceases to be pluralism. This self-undermining dynamic necessitates a rethink.

Pluralist economics, constrained by its obligation to maintain neutrality among paradigms, cannot evolve into a vehicle for transformative change. As argued in "The Project of Pluralism", displacing mainstream economics requires fostering coordination between scientific inquiry and civil society actors—NGOs, think tanks, political parties, media, and social movements. Yet the paradox of pluralism ensures such alliances remain elusive, as its inherent fragmentation precludes the strategic alignment needed for reform.

To circumvent this impasse, the curriculum reform movement in economics should adopt a dual strategy. On one hand, it should tactically deploy pluralist economics where methodological diversity critiques mainstream orthodoxy—e.g., challenging neoclassical hegemony in pedagogy. On the other hand, it must pivot toward a narrow paradigmatic approach—not rooted in a specific heterodox school like Keynesianism or ecological economics, nor in the fragmented concept of “heterodoxy” itself. Instead, what is needed is a problem-oriented framework anchoring diversity to a shared focal point for collaboration. Such a framework would embed internal pluralism within a structured agenda, balancing openness with strategic direction, while prioritizing solutions to material crises—economic instability, inequality, ecological breakdown—over abstract methodological debates. Crucially, it must engage actors beyond academia—policymakers, social movements, civil society—through actionable proposals. Only this approach can transcend the paradox of pluralism, bridging its intellectual richness with the strategic coherence required for transformation.

One might object that elements of this dual strategy already exist: frameworks like Degrowth or Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) strategically advocate pluralism where useful while advancing their own paradigms. This objection is valid but overlooks two critical gaps. First, these approaches often lack systematic integration with the institutional efforts of the curriculum reform movement, which remains predominantly focused on abstract pluralist demands. Second, their influence on mainstream curricula and policy remains limited, partly due to their specialized focus (e.g., monetary sovereignty or biophysical limits) rather than a unifying lens capable of synthesizing heterodox critiques. The planning paradigm, by centering the universal practice of economic organization, offers such a lens.

A 'New Economics of Collapse and Construction' would retain pluralism’s spirit by accommodating essential heterodox schools—feminist, ecological, post-growth, Keynesian, Marxist—while embedding them within an integrative framework. It would synthesize heterodox economics with critical social science traditions (e.g., political ecology, sociology of power, decolonial theory) to form a more cohesive, transformative agenda. Crucially, this approach would transcend methodological diversity, anchoring pluralism to a shared vision of societal transformation capable of bridging academic critique with real-world action.

Conclusion: A Strategic Bridge for Pluralist Economics

My argument is not a naïve appeal for universal adoption of the planning paradigm. Instead, I advance two interrelated claims. First, I seek to identify and theorize an already emergent shift—the New Economics of Collapse and Construction—of which the planning paradigm is a vital pillar. This paradigm extends beyond the “socialist calculation 2.0” debate to encompass policy discourses on industrial strategy, macroeconomic governance, and macrofinancial frameworks. These threads signal a nascent reconceptualization of economics bridging theory, policy, and institutional design.

Second, I contend that forging organic linkages between heterodox schools—and pluralist economics—with this emergent paradigm could catalyze a science-political actor capable of dual transformation. Such an actor would not only advance curriculum reform by displacing mainstream economics’ hegemony but also drive a progressive paradigm shift in economic policymaking and public discourse. By anchoring pluralism within the planning paradigm’s problem-driven focus on reorganizing economies, heterodox traditions could transcend marginalization. This synthesis would allow them to retain methodological diversity while coalescing around actionable solutions to material crises—climate breakdown, inequality, financial instability—amplifying their relevance to policymakers, social movements, and civil society.

In short, the planning paradigm offers a more potent strategic bridge than existing alternatives: it explicitly links pluralism's intellectual richness to the institutional leverage points of curriculum reform while providing the integrative capacity to coalesce fragmented heterodox critiques—from feminist economics to Degrowth—around actionable solutions. This positions it uniquely to achieve the traction that specialized paradigms, despite their merits, have struggled to secure within academia and policy.

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